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Abstract: Calls for cross-scalar theoretical and methodological approaches are
not new to commons scholarship. Such efforts might be hastened by channelling
poststructuralist and critical theory perspectives through the geographic subfield
of political ecology, including attention to political scales and subjects. Toward
this end, this paper reconsiders Maine’s lobster fishery. This case has provided
rich material for watershed commons scholarship, demonstrating the ability of
social groups to conserve resources independent of government or markets, and
it continues to offer new findings. Recent fieldwork shows that as lobster boat
captains advance collective interests through state-supported co-management
governance arrangements, concerns of crew and non-fishing community members
may be marginalized. Regulatory exclusion prevents broader distribution of
resource benefits at a time when employment alternatives are scarce. More
pluralistic approaches to commons theory and its policy application have utility
well beyond the lobster case.
Keywords: Co-management, fisheries, Homarus americanus, lobster, privati
zation, United States
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1. Introduction
Over almost a quarter century, anthropologist Jim Acheson’s seminal monograph
The Lobster Gangs of Maine (1988) has introduced thousands of readers to
common property theory. Urbanites and suburbanites are often fascinated with the
book’s description of a lobsterfisherman’s1 workday, and conflicts over access to
fishing grounds. Some perceive for the first time that society can organize beyond
the reach of government and markets to encourage collectively beneficial human
behaviours. If we follow the case through Acheson’s more recent work, that of
economist Jim Wilson, and references in the writings of Nobel laureate Elinor
Ostrom and fellow travelers, we see more clearly how the fishery sheds new
light on theories of institutions, games, and complex systems (Berkes et al. 1989;
Acheson and Knight 2000; Ostrom 2005, 2009; Wilson 2007; Wilson et al. 2007;
Acheson and Gardner 2011). We also learn that the jurisdictional environment
in which Maine lobstermen operate has evolved into co-management, a sharing
of resource decision making between government and resource users (Acheson
2003). This arrangement of nested informal and formal institutions opens new
possibilities to investigate cross-scalar dynamics, phenomena less thoroughly
considered by commons scholars thus far (Agrawal 2002; Dietz et al. 2003; Young
2006; Berkes 2008).
Provided with this solid empirical and conceptual platform comprising three
decades of data adeptly theorized by leading commons theorists, the present paper
re-examines the Maine lobster case through a somewhat different lens, and offers
complimentary findings. Its approach is rooted in the discipline of geography,
entraining intersecting perspectives of political ecology, poststructuralism,
and feminist critical theory, all of which play central roles in contemporary
geographic scholarship. Specifically, this paper focuses on political scales,
and associated understandings of the political subject. In doing so, it revisits
collective action solutions to common pool resource management dilemmas in
nested institutional contexts, with a geographic appreciation for scale as both
causal and contingent (Sayre 2005; Stallins 2012). Data collection and analysis
explicitly consider multiple scales and subjectivities, including the strategic
formation of collective identities, and corresponding mobilization of local or
supra-local political resources. In addition to assessing the capacity of lobster
license holders to collectively advance shared interests, this synthesis facilitates
understanding of the extent to which those apparent solutions address, aggravate,
or marginalize present and future concerns of more diverse publics. It investigates
multiple junctures at which political subjects are constituted and re-constituted,
including arenas in which access to fishery-related resources is determined. Like
Most Maine women who fish commercially voluntarily self-identify as “fishermen,” so the term
“lobsterman” is used here to include both men and women. The vast majority of lobster license holders are male (97% in a 2002 random mail survey, n = 29), but numbers of female crew and captains
are increasing (Brewer 2012).
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any scholarship fully informed by poststructuralist feminism, it claims only a
partial perspective, exposing a reality that persists in tandem with other narratives,
including the important work by Acheson and others. Rules of resource use that
seem rational or desirable at one unit of analysis, may entail tradeoffs at another.
This recognition leverages questions about the evolution of commons scholarship,
and about co-management, which has become a normative natural resource
policy model, especially in less developed and indigenous contexts (Agrawal and
Gibson 1999; Dongier et al. 2002; Wilson et al. 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2004;
Feit and Spaeder 2005; Young 2006; Armitage et al. 2008; Nelson and Agrawal
2008; Rasul et al. 2011). It echoes prior work in other fisheries, demonstrating
how management changes can inadvertently exacerbate conservation or equity
concerns (Copes 1986; Munk-Madsen 1998; National Research Council 1999;
Eythórsson 2000; Mansfield 2004; Degnbol et al. 2006; Pinkerton and Edwards
2009; Gibbs 2010; Carothers 2011).
1.1. The geographic lens of political ecology
Roughly simultaneous with the emergence of interdisciplinary common property
theory in the 1980s and 1990s, which was strongly informed by ecological
anthropology (e.g. Netting 1976; McCay and Acheson 1987; Wade 1988) and
of which a central strain tended toward rational choice theory (e.g. Ostrom et al.
1991; Baland and Platteau 1996; Acheson 1998), anthropologists and geographers
cultivated a shared literature on political ecology. This emerged directly out of
cultural ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Ellen 1988; Turner 1989; Rappaport
1990; Robbins 2004), the latter having already borrowed systems theory from
the relatively young biological subfield of ecology (Moran 1990; Zimmerer
1996). While anthropologists adopted systems frameworks within the Stewardian
ethnographic tradition of ecological anthropology, geographers introduced it to
the Sauerian tradition of landscape morphology, or historical narratives of land
use and resource management (Sauer 1941; Steward 1955; Brookfield 1964;
Orlove 1980; Bebbington and Carney 1990). These two variants of political
ecology increasingly inform one another, yet the anthropological retains its
more ethnographic and deeply discursive focus, while the geographic remains
more intent on material outcomes and cross-scalar analyses. Both rely on mainly
qualitative methods of field data collection and analysis at local scales to raise
questions about differential access to ecological goods and services as a causal
driver in dynamic human-environment systems. Political ecology has thus arisen
as a central movement within the scholarship of human-environment relations
alongside common property theory, and many political ecologists and common
property theorists are familiar with the other literature. Since few scholars publish
routinely for both audiences, however, it would seem that deeper exchange is
overdue. In particular, political ecology gains traction from tenets of poststructural
and critical theory, which commons theory has not generally embraced.
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The importance of political scale to geographers should be obvious, especially
to those understanding the discipline as the study of spatial relations more than
the study of human-environment relationships (e.g. Brenner 2001; Cox 2003;
cf. Turner 2002). Central to the present paper, poststructuralist theory replaces
deterministic tendencies of hierarchical and binary structuralist frameworks that
fix dependent and independent variables at particular scales. Scalar fixity can
expose certain phenomena and obscure others, lending an aura of completeness
and finality to politico-theoretical constructs. By contrast, a poststructuralist
proclivity for scalar pluralism encourages competing analyses at alternate scales,
and can more easily cross the boundaries between public and private spheres
presumed by pre-feminist liberalism (e.g. Marston 2000; Gal 2002; Popke 2003).
We might think of poststructuralism as the humanistic strain of complexity theory,
reaching commons theory by a parallel but epistemologically distinct route (cf.
Cox 2011). Explicitly or not, most political ecologists accept general precepts of
poststructuralism, recognizing the fluidity and emergent nature of relationships
between mutually constitutive social constructions, such as hegemon and subaltern,
knowledge and power, local and global, and symbolic and socio-material (e.g.
Escobar 1996; Rocheleau et al. 1996; Mosse 2003).
In turn, poststructuralism has close linkages to feminism, especially in
the French psychoanalytic tradition, and feminists are largely responsible for
introducing poststructuralism to geography and political ecology (e.g. GibsonGraham 1995; Massey 1995; Katz 2001; Rocheleau and Roth 2007; Elmhirst
2011; Nightingale 2011). Research informed by feminist perspectives, whether
structuralist or poststructuralist, tends to accommodate phenomena at the scales
of households and individuals, recognizing that pre-feminist scholarship often
ignores variables relating to unpaid domestic labour, and lived experiences of
women and other household members perceived by researchers or informants as
marginal to the central concerns of adult men. Moving forward the ethical projects
of critical theory, more committed feminist analyses trace causal linkages that cross
from household and individual scales to larger spatial scales such as village, state,
and markets. They note both the influence of larger scales on smaller ones, and
the extent to which resistance strategies at smaller scales, including interpersonal,
knowledge, and cultural-symbolic struggles often excluded from pre-feminist
conceptions of the political realm, can influence larger scale phenomena (e.g.
Enloe 2000; Harding 2008).
Though more so in anthropology than in geography, some political ecologists
have actively engaged in the cultural turn among social sciences, including
understandings of multivalent personal identities as social constructions (e.g.
Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Rocheleau and Roth 2007; Elmhirst 2011). Some
with poststructural inclinations explore subjectivity more deeply, rejecting dualistic
taxonomies of structure and agency that undergird some structuralist work.
Poststructuralism instead finds analytic purchase in conceptions of multiple human
experiences and symbolic-representational domains as mutually constitutive, and
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therefore existing in states of constant plurality, flux, and transformation (e.g.
Kristeva 1986 [1973]; Cixous and Clément 1986 [1975]). Merged with critical
theory, this opens opportunities to theorize emergent subjectivities, simultaneous
subjugation and resistance, and embodied relations shaped by a multiplicity of
motivations, rationalities, allegiances, and materialities. Unlike the structuralism
of conventional Marxist political economy, poststructural critical theory recognizes
that social status or positionality is relative and contextual, not absolute.

2. Retelling the familiar tale of Maine’s lobster commons
Amply documented, the Maine lobster fishery offers classic collective action
solutions to free rider challenges in natural resource management (Acheson
1988, 1997; Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; Acheson and Knight 2000;
Ostrom 2005; Wilson et al. 2007). The most repeated stories revolve around
lobster boat captains, their daily lobster chase, and related events on the water.
Lobstermen create rules that constrain lobstering effort, some enforced through
local custom, others codified as law or regulation. Longstanding legal rules
maintain reproductive capacity, including harvest protections for egg-bearing
female lobsters, and for small and large lobsters (Acheson 1997). Lobstermen both
compete and cooperate beyond the scope of law, forming harbour-based groups to
claim areas of ocean bottom for the setting of lobster traps, and using social and
physical sanctions to enforce those area boundaries. Physical sanctions can include
damaging or destroying fishing gear, equipment, or other property, or spoken or
unspoken threats of violence to person or property. Social sanctions can include
gossip, slander, or shunning, all of which can have significant consequences in
the dense economic networks of fishing villages (Acheson 1988; Brewer 2012).
Lobstermen use similar sanctions to prevent newcomers from lobstering unless
they have strong local ties, usually premised on kinship. More recently, they also
use regulatory means to prevent newcomers from lobstering, restricting entry
primarily to teenagers with a multi-year commitment to lobstering. The state of
Maine has enabled a sharing of co-management responsibility between fishermen
and government, with outcomes that are widely praised (Acheson and Brewer
2000; Acheson and Taylor 2001; Acheson 2003; Wilson et al. 2007; Steneck and
Wilson 2010). State government now largely supports the customary management
regime, though gross violations of the law are penalized more vigorously than in
the past.
Less often told by scholars are narratives about fishing crew and non-fishing
members of fishing-dependent towns. Also less explored are relationships between
the fishery and government agencies, and between the lobster fishery and other
fisheries that share overlapping fishing group memberships, fishing grounds, and
habitat and trophic variables linking lobster to other fished species (Brewer 2010,
2012). These broader narratives raise new questions about politico-lobstering
identities and scales of analysis as understood by commons scholars. In fact, if we
adopt an analytical lens informed by the geographic variant of political ecology,
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a more mixed assessment of social and material outcomes somewhat dampens
optimism about co-management of the lobster commons. As some lobster
fishery interests advance, gaining unprecedented management influence, more
broadly defined interests of coastal villages recede from those decision arenas.
These changes take place against a backdrop of larger social changes, but can
nonetheless be partly traced to co-management mechanisms and associated shifts
in salient political scales and subjectivities. As described following, one cluster
of changes is most readily framed in terms of policy and regulation, and includes
associated shifts in fishing practices and the parameters of fishery membership.
A second cluster pertains to individual and household livelihood strategies within
the context of local economies. Evidence integrates prior empirical work with my
own field data conducted between 1989 and 2012 (Acheson and Brewer 2000;
Brewer 2010, 2011, 2012).
2.1. Fishing practices and policies
Existing case literature documents a causal chain by which federal lobster
management preferences at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
influenced the New England Fishery Management Council, which was the lead
regional regulatory body in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Commission, which was the lead regional regulatory body from
the 1990s onward. In turn, Maine’s executive and legislative decision makers found
themselves cornered between federal pressures, state commitments to represent
the interests of its fishing communities, and limited logistical ability to enforce
unpopular regulations on thousands of boats from dozens of harbours (Acheson
and Taylor 2001; Acheson 2003; Brewer 2012). Of these regulatory challenges,
the most immediately relevant to our discussion involved federal efforts in the
early 1990s to set a uniform, region-wide maximum number of lobster traps per
lobstering boat. Opposition to a federally-mandated trap limit arose in Maine,
partly among a few locally-described “hogs” who were setting unprecedented
numbers of traps, but also among less greedy fishermen who had always been free
to tailor individualized fishing strategies, including trap numbers. Lobstermen
normally make strategic capital and labour investment decisions in response to
considerations such as the spatial and temporal availability of harvestable lobsters;
local tidal and seafloor characteristics; fluctuations in dockside lobster prices;
prices of variable inputs such as fuel, bait, and labour; capital investments in boat
and engine; personal physical health; desire for shoreside time with family; crew
availability; and peer norms (Acheson 1998, 2003; Brewer 2012). Regulatory
interference in such decisions was rare before the 1990s.
Caught between federal pressure and industry resistance, leadership at Maine
Department of Marine Resources averted a jurisdictional showdown on trap limits
by devolving decision authority. They created seven state lobster co-management
zones with elected councils, each including several harbours (see Figure 1). They
granted lobster license holders the power to vote by majority rule for or against a
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Figure 1: Lobster co-management zones.

trap limit in their zone, and on the maximum number of traps allowed under such
a limit. Because a majority of license holders supported the general concept of a
trap limit, but varied in views about the locally appropriate maximum number of
traps, each zone eventually passed its own limit (Acheson 1998, 2003; Acheson
and Taylor 2001). Initially, trap limit supporters wished to constrain hogs, and
reduce trap tangles caused by excessive, hastily set, and infrequently tended gear.
A majority soon concluded that trap limits also reallocate an aggregate lobster
harvest that is relatively constant in the overall percentage of available lobsters
trapped. With a smaller number of better-tended traps, average catch per trap
haul increased. Trap limits thereby introduced new incentives for boats fishing
fewer traps to set more, reducing some of the most exaggerated income disparities
among boats previously fishing vary large or very small numbers of traps, and now
fishing more equal amounts of gear. As a result, it is likely that trap limits slowed
the statewide rate of trap increase, but they did not reduce the total number of traps
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(Acheson and Brewer 2000; Brewer 2012). In the view of Maine’s state lobster
biologist, after observing the fishery closely for more than a decade, trap limits
may not be very effective as a lobster conservation tool unless set at levels about
half what most zones established (field notes, 2008). More revealing of problems
intrinsic to the co-management governance arrangement, however, questions
arise as to the socio-ecological value of a large lobster population. The population
has repeatedly broken records over the last two decades, supporting record profits
that compensate for low dockside prices caused by the global economic recession.
While the large lobster population is often attributed to careful state management,
including local norms and co-management (Acheson 1988, 2003; Acheson and
Taylor 2001), it is likely that water temperatures, declines in predator populations,
and the availability of bait in lobster traps are also causal drivers (Steneck and
Wilson 2001; Saila et al. 2002; Chang et al. 2010).
Much of the federal pressure to maintain high lobster populations, with trap
limits and other means, comes from mandates in the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, and amendments in the Sustainable Fisheries Act of
1996. Law requires that all managed fish species maintain maximum sustainable
yield, a standard derived by fisheries scientists in the early and mid 20th century
from agricultural and industrial production models (Larkin 1977; Pahl-Wostl
1995; St. Martin 2001; Finley 2009). The impossibility of maintaining multiple
species at maximum levels is obvious, especially with datasets on species
abundance that vary in spatial and temporal extent, and therefore generate different
historical and spatial baselines. The Congressional mandates, as interpreted by
environmental organizations, courts, and government lawyers, make it difficult
for stock assessments to address spatial and temporal heterogeneity, such as
variables relating to benthic habitat, oceanographic conditions, trophic relations,
fishing gear usage, or species cycles of migration, growth, and reproduction.
Assessment scientists generally assume that their datasets have sufficient spatial
and temporal coverage to incorporate these variables, despite extensive evidence
to the contrary (Ludwig et al. 1993; Wilson et al. 1999; Jackson et al. 2001; Ames
2004; Walters et al. 2005). More concerning, “limited access” and “catch share”
policies promoted increasingly by federal managers since the 1980s, and intended
to maintain maximum sustainable yield, discourage fishermen from adapting
to dynamic marine systems by shifting fishing effort among a number of target
species (Wilson et al. 1991; Brewer 2011). Regulatory mechanisms reflecting
these policies prevent the entry of new fishermen, locking holders of permits into
maximal usage of each existing permit, to avoid losing it in the likelihood of
future regulatory restrictions on purportedly “underutilized” permits or harvest
allocations. In many fisheries, catch share mechanisms make limited access
permits and associated harvest allocations saleable, further increasing the incentive
to maximize species harvests, lest the resale value of the permit decline.
Despite efforts by Maine decision makers to avoid observed problems with
regulatory entry limits and catch shares, lobster co-management followed the
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same pattern (Brewer 2012). Shortly after the zones limited trap numbers, most
requested, and were granted, permission to reduce the number of lobstering licenses
issued by the state, first at moderate rates of decrease, then more drastically. This
has effectively closed the fishery, except to young people who can still gain access
if they hold a student license for three years before turning 18. Most zones have
accumulated license waiting lists years long. Only one zone remains open, with
no regulatory entry limit. Few license holders now retire their licenses, knowing
they can never be replaced, and anticipating the possibility that license transfer
or sale might be legalized in the future. Transferable licenses for some other
New England fisheries, especially scallops, have brought windfall profits of one
or two million US dollars. An effect of near closure in the lobster fishery has
been to concentrate lobster earnings among a small number of coastal residents
at a time when lobstering profits hit record highs, while other jobs and earnings
endure recession-induced lows. This has been accomplished in the zones through
anonymous, mail-in ballot voting for low ratios of license issues to license nonrenewals, so that lobstermen have excluded neighbours and kin without public
scrutiny or participation (Brewer 2012). Anonymous voting mechanisms and
entry limits effectively removed lobster fishery decision making from its broader
social context. In the past, lobster politics were enmeshed with the interests of
other fisheries, shoreside businesses, kinship, and household economies. Many
fishermen participated in a number of fisheries (Acheson 1988; Wilson 1990;
Brewer 2010). Each also contributed to, and benefitted from, a diversity of paid
and unpaid labour in household, kin, and village economies. While lobster license
holders always played dominating roles in lobster fishery decisions, they were
somewhat constrained by dense social networks. They relied heavily on nonlobstermen for essential shoreside goods and services, and for access to other
fisheries (Acheson 1988; Wilson 1990; Brewer 2012). Since zone creation, state
lobster politics are now under more exclusive purview of lobster license holders.
Concurrently, state legislative oversight has lessened on many fishery agency
and zone decisions. This was one rationale for co-management zone creation, since
the potential for jurisdictional conflicts was rising. Prior to the 1990s, Maine’s
legislature played a central role in lobster management (Acheson 1988, 2003).
Under new federal policies promoting limited access and catch shares to satisfy
simplistic species yield models, pressures on the state legislature increased from
federal, regional, and state fishery management agencies, and from the fishing
industry (Brewer 2012). In cases of state non-compliance with regional mandates,
federal agencies can withhold funds otherwise destined for state coffers. Further,
increasingly computational stock assessments raise the level of statistical and
biological knowledge required for management decisions. The lobster industry
has held a special place in Maine’s identity and political life for several decades,
but since zone creation, lobster license holders have become more organized, more
politically adept, more confident in promoting their interests, and more bold in
obstructing others. Under zone co-management, the state fisheries agency retains
lobster fishery jurisdiction, but political incentives are high to oblige any vote of a
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zone majority. Knowing this, most zones have discussed the possibility of further
restricting licenses for those under the age of 18. Non-license-holding crew are
unable to cast zone votes, though most boats employ one crew member, and many
crew are highly lobster-dependent, with few marketable skills outside the fishing
industry. Even as other fisheries struggle to maintain viable businesses due to
fish migratory changes, fish population declines, and regulatory constraints, when
lobstermen accidentally catch those species in traps, they routinely spear them
as bait instead of releasing them to grow and reproduce. Some lobstermen use
new zone boundaries and membership to legitimize setting traps on bottom once
exclusively controlled by neighbouring harbour groups (Brewer 2012). More
open conflicts between lobstermen and other fishermen have increased, with more
lobstermen accusing otter trawlers2 of wrecking traps, and more trawlers accusing
lobstermen of setting traps on grounds previously dedicated to trawling.
Engineers of the lobster zones, including state agency personnel, academics,
industry members, and legislative representatives, wished to avoid precisely this
kind of species specialization and commodification (Brewer 2012). Given federal
trends toward entry barriers and catch shares, in the absence of state intervention,
they anticipated shifts in the industry’s diversified and adaptive thinking about
multiple ecological relationships and overlapping management interests toward
a narrower set of fishery-specific interests as understood in the more exclusive
and utilitarian calculus of individual license holders. They hoped, however, that
industry participation in the new zone co-management arenas would prevent such
shifts, given the more communitarian ethic of Maine’s rural fishing communities,
with an interest in providing sustainable livelihoods to their children and
grandchildren. Instead, license holders seized on the unprecedented opportunity
to advance their immediate interests, modelling exclusionary proposals after
trends in fisheries such as scallops and groundfish, where federal pressure for
entry closure and catch shares has made faster progress. They felt particularly
justified in doing so since most lobstermen had been closed out of scalloping and
groundfishing by federal regulations supported by some scallop and groundfish
permit holders. Interestingly, those closures were accomplished through the
New England Fishery Management Council, which is itself a co-management
entity, albeit a regional one with little opportunity for local input (Butler et al.
2001; Brewer 2011). These cascading changes in fisheries policy and regulatory
frameworks, initiated at the federal level, but advanced at the state and local level,
have reconfigured the political subjectivities of lobster license holders. Where they
were once constrained by local relationships among household members, kin, and
neighbours, license holders are now more free to advance personal interests and
consolidate economic and political power.
Otter trawls are net gear that are heavily weighted to capture finfish on or near the ocean bottom.
The word trawler usually refers to a boat that is built and rigged to fish with a trawl. It is sometimes
used to refer to a fisherman who regularly fishes using a trawl.
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2.2. Livelihoods, households, and villages
Beyond the relatively formalized context of policy and state-enabled rulemaking,
subtler changes have taken hold. These are deeply embedded in the personal
identities of lobster fishermen and fellow villagers, affecting livelihood strategies
and the terms of interpersonal relationships. Some of these changes are woven
into larger social trends, partially driven by forces distant from lobstering
villages. Nonetheless, new rationalities are also inspired by the unprecedented
capacities for political autonomy among lobster license holders under the new
co-management regime.
For at least a half century, and likely since European settlement, multigenerational families in coastal villages have maintained deep and pervasive
kin ties, including economic interdependencies. Many live close to immediate
family, often on land that is given, inherited, or purchased below market value,
in houses built by kin and neighbours. In addition to fishing for cash income,
subsistence and barter activities have been essential components of diversified
livelihood strategies. Family and friends assist with activities such as maintaining
fishing boats and gear, providing wood for heat, hunting and gathering, vegetable
gardens, vehicle and mechanical repairs, home and property maintenance projects,
childcare, eldercare, and domestic chores (Brewer 2012). Kin relationships also
carry symbolic meanings, and influence social and political standing (Acheson
1988; Brewer 2012). Surname-based reputations, allegiances, quarrels, prejudices,
and power often endure for decades.
Prior to the introduction of co-management zones, and especially secret ballot
voting, lobster fishery decisions were made by individuals embedded deeply
within this dense and complex social milieu of local kin and neighbours. Coastal
villages have long held boat captains in high esteem, but historically lobster boat
captains fell lower on the hierarchy than captains of larger fishing and freight
vessels. The status of crew has always been low, though in the past, the more
hardworking and capable among them had reasonable aspirations to captain their
own boats in the future. Wives and other family members of lobstermen rarely
voiced opinions on lobstering activities per se, and those doing so were easily
overruled by boat captains. Most fishermen were nonetheless reliant on wives and
family for shoreside labour, and therefore somewhat cognizant of their concerns
and interests. Virtually all wives relayed messages for fishermen, and timed meals,
laundry, and other household activities to accommodate fishing schedules. Many
kept all financial records for the household and business, ran business-related
errands, and provided food and additional support to crew.
The last two decades brought major changes to southern Maine coastal
communities, and less dramatic changes to more northeastern coastal villages,
which are farther removed from suburbanization trends. An influx of relatively
wealthy seasonal visitors and year-round residents from more urban parts of
the northeastern U.S. to the gentrifying coast spurred growth in services and
construction, offering new employment options for both women and men, in
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jobs that increase exposure to non-fishing and non-local interests. These include
the building trades, landscaping, retail, and provision of food, beverages,
accommodations, recreational activities, financial and legal services, health
care and personal services. The new jobs are less physically demanding than
fishing, and, prior to the recession, seemed to offer more reliable incomes, with
more predictable advancement opportunities. Many such jobs are not located in
peninsular fishing villages, but in towns a few miles inland, with larger populations,
more diversified economies, and closer access to major roads. They help women
join the paid economy and become less reliant on the fishing incomes of men.
Less household labour is devoted to barter and natural resource economies. Nonfishing men and women are less apt to claim a stake in fishing futures as family,
neighbours, or providers of fishery-related goods and services, and are unlikely to
object to the exclusion of new license holders from lobstering.
Given this context, fishing villages were already changing prior to lobster
co-management. The recession interrupted these trends by dramatically reducing
non-fishing employment options, however. Many of the new income streams have
slowed dramatically. Small construction-related businesses that employed three to
five people in 2007 were scarcely employing one or two by 2011 (field interviews,
2007, 2009, 2011). Available jobs in health care, hospitality, and professional
services require skill sets unfamiliar to most would-be lobstermen, and most
casualties of the construction bust. Most available jobs are in urban areas, requiring
unmanageable commutes from fishing villages. For Mainers without jobs, and
without job prospects, lobstering is no longer the fallback option it always was
in the past. It is now only a realistic choice for those who have held a license
and renewed it annually for more than a decade, for those willing to crew with
no hope of ever running a boat themselves, and for those younger than 15 with
the foresight to get and renew a license. This exclusivity affects not only wouldbe lobsterfishermen, but their partners, families, and neighbours. In addition to
providing the unpaid labour described above, some villagers, especially those
without full time paid jobs, would have helped increase and circulate household
lobstering income by painting buoys, stuffing bait bags, or crewing, especially
since the presence of women on lobster boats and wharves has become more
socially accepted in recent years.
In other respects, zone letters have replaced more traditional identities. For most
of the twentieth century, new fishermen were often prevented from establishing
a viable lobstering business, or setting traps in certain areas, due to absent or
tenuous kin relationships, a relatively short period of local residence, or some
unusual personal history. They might be warned or ostracized, their traps might
be cut off, other personal property might be damaged, or they might experience
personal threats (Acheson 1988; Brewer 2012). There were sometimes openings
for negotiation, however, such as moving traps to different bottom, talking it out,
seeking and mobilizing allies within the fishery to retaliate or lobby on one’s
behalf, or patiently waiting out the opposition (Brewer 2012). Under regulatory
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entry limits, negotiation is impossible. Zone-affiliated lobstering identities are thus
more permanent and exclusive than their pre-zone incarnations. Now, if someone
stops lobstering, such as to retire, do other work, or recover from illness or injury,
the license is usually renewed, since it can never be regained, once lost. In the
past, lobstering was perceived as something more like a repeated choice, even if
one made every day for an entire lifetime. Some people never did any other kind
of paid work, but there was always other work to be done for subsistence and
barter. One often had the option of leaving the boat ashore to do something else
for a few months or longer, such as building a house or recovering from an injury.
Some went on longer and more distant fishing trips for scallops, groundfish, or
tuna, on their own boats or larger ones.
Given the security of a limited entry license that excludes many prospective
competitors, plus a recent history of record lobster harvests and profits, many
lobstermen took on large loans and mortgages in the 1990s and 2000s. While
a used lobster skiff and gear can be found for less than US$15,000, a big new
boat, engine, and traps can easily amount to more than US$100,000. As global
markets continue to reel from the 2008 economic crisis, ex-vessel lobster prices
have fallen to multi-decade lows. In some eastern Maine harbours, where landings
have been exceptionally high, gross profits are still recordbreaking (field notes,
January 2010). In westerly harbours, however, where landings have levelled off,
lobstermen with large debt can barely break even (Acheson and Acheson 2010:
field notes, March, 2012). They now have no choice but to go lobstering, and
go hard, because there are no other jobs available that could pay those loans.
Further, some fear that present lobstering histories may be used to qualify for
future lobstering access, if lobster populations decline and fleet consolidation
emerges as a proposed regulatory response. Such a scenario would closely
mimic other limited entry fisheries, especially federally managed ones, where
landings histories determine catch quota allocations. While some of the impetus
to incur unprecedented lobster business debt arises from record lobstering profits,
state-supported entry restrictions lend a sense of economic entitlement and
political confidence to license holders.
Identities of lobster-reliant villagers thereby reify as the state and fellow
lobstermen grant apparently permanent lobstering privileges. Concurrently, nonlobstering identities of villagers denied those privileges also become entrenched.
Especially in more eastern towns, boat captains as young as their early 20s
proudly command shiny new trucks and boats, while non-lobstering peers and
elders choose between paying for home repairs and health care. Some lobstermen
now grappling with low lobster prices more loudly lament their exclusion from
other fisheries, and use the argument to advance license transfer proposals. One
said publicly to state legislators, “Ever since you put us in a box…. It used to all
connect. Now you’ve got us all boxed in or divided and conquered or whatever
it is… I lost my scallop license. I lost numerous licenses… It’s always been a
family thing.” He then asserted that kids with trust funds are fishing in his zone,
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and argued that he should be allowed to sell his license. His rhetorical strategy
posits lobster license sale as the solution to inter-species flexibility lost through
consolidation of access to scallops and other fisheries. Inviting accusations of
ethical fallacy, and shirking any personal liability by establishing that government
and the idle rich are responsible for precipitating wrongs, he offers privatization
as appropriate redress for the errors of privatization, since this time he would end
up on the winning end of the deal.
Legal exclusivity has cultivated a more governmentalized rationality
among license holders. Lobstermen previously perceived government and law
as marginal to lobstering activities. They generally accepted the few existing
regulations, including bans on the taking of productive females and undersize
and oversize lobsters, as means to protect the industry from lobster population
declines experienced in the 1920s and 1930s (Acheson and Steneck 1997). In
sharp contrast, day-to-day determination of who got to fish and where was centred
around harbour-based concerns. Kin and neighbours served as fishery gatekeepers.
Local relationships comprised the primary means of personal influence on access
opportunities, whether through combative or cooperative strategies. Now, state
government is the central ally in decisions and constraints concerning access.
This effectively segregates license holder interests from the more complex
interdependencies of coastal villages. State administration of voting enables
aggregated license holder preferences to supersede discussion that might have
taken place at the local level.
Judgment as to the desirability or undesirability of this governmentalization
depends partly on whether one focuses on moments of local, extra-governmental
discussion that might be characterized as pluralistic, communitarian, or fraught
with prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, all such moments can be observed,
at different times, in different places. One can argue that the lobster zones
opened more neutral spaces for public deliberation that are transparent to state
oversight, in which lobster license holders can consider the merits of any change
in the allocation of resource access, and cast a vote in without fear of reprisals
for dissent. Minority interests might thereby be better protected, even while the
majority rules. In this liberal perspective, the politico-lobstering subject might
be seen as modernized, removed from the archaic pressures of nepotism and
prejudice. In newly administrative fishery decisions arenas, reason is expected to
overcome emotion, yielding more rational outcomes. From a more communitarian
perspective, however, the zones shift the scale of lobstering activities, lobstering
identities, and the political leverage of lobstering interests in ways that incur longterm costs to collective interests of coastal communities. The state and license
holders allied to accomplish regulatory exclusion, veiled in conservation rhetoric,
and largely without visible opposition. They removed resource management
decision making from local publics, where ideals of equal opportunity, justice,
and pluralist identities might be voiced, and where debate might compare these
lofty ideas to lived realities. In this time of economic uncertainty, without legal
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entry limits, villagers might have exerted sufficient pressure on lobstermen to
allow more new boat captains among kin and neighbours, distributing lobstering
profits more equitably, not just among the anointed few. This paper cannot aspire
to resolve those debates, though they are relevant to the broader development
of common property theory, and its relationship to longstanding tensions in
democratic theory. Less ambitiously, the following returns to the aforementioned
geographic traditions in poststructural political ecology and critical theory, with
the more modest intent to leverage additional analytic purchase on issues of scale
and subjectivity as they may impinge on the margins of these democratic debates,
and on associated policy implications of commons scholarship.

3. Political scales and subjectivities
Recognition of political scales as multiple and interactive reveals important
insights in the lobster case. Assessed from the perspective of lobster license holders,
lobster co-management seems to be a success. License holders have agreed to
constrain fishing effort through trap limits and entry limits. Lobster populations
are abundant and trap increases have slowed, increasing or stabilizing average
catch per unit of fishing effort, as measured in labour and monetary inputs. It is
not clear, however, that the lobster population would have declined without these
constraints. Discrepancies in scalar assumptions about lobster population dynamics
linger between federal and state scientists. Further, at village to statewide scales,
questions arise about the public value of large lobster populations, the distribution
of benefits and costs of lobster conservation, and the status of other ecological
goods and services co-located with lobster. Distribution of lobstering income is
now restricted to a narrower group of direct beneficiaries. This narrowing will
continue unless some action is taken to reverse it, as a disproportionate number
of older license holders age into retirement, and the state issues few new licenses.
In western harbours, teenagers have little financial incentive to maintain a license
now, unless they anticipate that lobster prices will rise as the economy improves.
While rebounding profits are quite possible, from global economic recovery or
reduced fishing input costs with lower trap limit proposals, teenagers tend to
pursue immediate rewards, with less interest in possible futures. Those without
three-year license histories when they turn 18 face 12–20 year waiting lists.
From the perspective of non-lobstering fishermen and their households, the
increasingly powerful lobster lobby can overwhelm other fishing interests, both
locally and in formal management. Groundfishermen increasingly encounter gear
conflicts with lobster traps, and local groundfish population recovery is hindered
by lobstermen spearing live fish as bait. Diversified fishermen who also set lobster
traps are particularly vulnerable if they protest, risking trap losses. Paradoxically,
the older management regime accommodated flexibility and pluralism at the
local level in ways that the present co-management regime does not. Formal and
informal rulemaking activities were conducted in dual spheres, one state controlled,
one locally controlled. Regulation focused on how to fish, such as by what size
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and reproductive criteria to select marketable catch, not what species to fish for.
Fishermen could switch target species on an annual or interannual basis, depending
on species abundance, markets, fishing or non-fishing labour availability, or
physical capabilities related to age or health. Since zone co-management merged
local and state management roles, pluralism is less in these respects. Zone entry
limits, and the prospect of further fleet consolidation, draw legal boundaries
between dedicated lobster boat captains and other villagers (Brewer 2012). The
latter group includes non-fishing would-be-lobstermen, non-lobstering fishermen
for other species, casual or dedicated lobstering crew who don’t hold licenses,
members of lobstering families who play shore support roles, and other residents
of coastal villages. Formerly diversified fishermen are now pressured to specialize
in lobster or another species. The zones are not simply mediators between local
and state-regional regimes; they disaggregate lobster license holder interests from
diversified fishing and non-fishing publics. This affects not only management
outcomes, but micro-scale institutions of household and village life. Zone
meetings erode the centrality of informal, iterated conversations in such places as
kitchens and workshops, where local non-lobstering interests might also be heard.
Ecological and economic implications of increased lobstering specialization
are significant. If the lobster population ever falters, many lobstermen will be
locked out of other fisheries for lack of landings history, and will have no viable
employment option. In this event, political pressure to permit continued levels of
lobstering activity would likely be acute, even at risk of further lobster population
declines.
While these changes manifest at the local level, they emerge from a multilayered jurisdictional context. Co-management arose as a state strategy to deter
federal usurpation of local, informal management. Though beyond the scope
of this article, that manoeuvre required executive and legislative coordination,
regional alliances with other state agencies, and support or tolerance from trade
groups representing portions of the lobster industry (Brewer 2012). In this
newly expanded political setting, encompassing villages, zones, state, region,
and nation, identities and subjectivities become central to the evolving politics
of co-management. When informal, local management persisted principally
beyond the optic of government, lobstermen weighed multiple loyalties and
beliefs in each decision about fishery entry and access (Brewer 2012). Pervasive
and multilayered webs of economic and symbolic relationships including
kinship, class,3 gender, and age all impinged on daily actions that supported,
undermined, or avoided conflicts over lobstering grounds, markets, information,
wharf space, labour, and other lobstering inputs. Each lobsterman’s words and
actions confirmed or contradicted village perceptions, affirming or attenuating
innumerable social ties and allegiances, and shaping personal identities. Under

3
The term “class” arises directly from field data collection, referring not only to differences between
fishing and non-fishing work, but to differences within and among fisheries.
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this regime, most lobstermen rarely went to lobster management meetings
organized by government. On rare occasion, perceiving some grave impact
from a proposed regulatory change, some number of them would appear at
a legislative or agency hearing in the state capitol. Such an adventure would
generally be undertaken as a group, to support a unified majority position. Many
travellers would not even speak up to the room as a whole, but intended their
presence to indicate support for bolder speakers from their harbour. In this
atmosphere, it was difficult to express dissenting or minority opinions without
substantial support from some faction and a willingness to take on considerable
financial risk, with lobstering gear and other property vulnerable to vandalism
back home.
Co-management does not obviate intensive village bonds, or censorship
of minority opinions, but it overlays a very different decision arena, in which
identities and political subjects are substantially reconstituted (Brewer 2012).
In the effectively segregated setting of zone meetings, kin, class, gender, and
age relations persist, but they compete with unprecedented legal identities of
license holders who presume more permanent resource access, ensured by the
state. Boat captains legally exclude new lobstermen with state support and
enforcement, and leverage state support to trump many non-lobstering coastal
interests. On the other hand, they are somewhat less free to persecute dissenting
fishermen with gear destruction because of greater scrutiny from the state as
management partner, and more frequent communication between industry
members and public officials. With many of the most controversial regulatory
decisions made by secret mail-in ballot, as in the instances of entry limits and
trap limits, minority opinions gain some traction, as do majority opinions
that might otherwise be vulnerable to retaliation from a powerful minority.
Spatial and temporal segregation of the voting act suspends interpersonal and
moral commitments that might otherwise maintain broadly negotiated resource
access. Voting in the isolation of one’s home excuses license holders from
public scrutiny. A decade ago, many of the lobstermen now voting to exclude
neighbours from lobstering couldn’t imagine supporting such a position.
For the vast majority, a first instinct was to voice the near-universal moral
abhorrence in their villages to the idea of privatizing a common property
resource. A second gut response was to note the centrality of lobstering income
to their village. The prospect of personal gain from regulatory privatization
was rarely discussed before zone creation. This changed rapidly, however. By
2011, individual license holder income had become a driving discursive force,
often couched as resource stewardship to mask the injustice of privatization:
the lobster population must be conserved, therefore increasingly restrictive
entry limits are necessary to control lobstering effort. Comments about village
reliance on lobster-related jobs are also heard, but less often than in the past,
and with weaker moral claims. Objections to entry limits as privatization are
now rare, except in conversation beyond the earshot of license holders. One
lobsterman who could likely sell his boat for tens of thousands of dollars
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upon retirement angrily asked a public panel of state legislators, “Why can’t
[licenses] be transferable or sellable? Because your business isn’t really worth
something unless you can sell it… I’d like to think that would be a retirement…
not have a dead thing sitting on top of you.”
License holder concerns do persist about the prospect of industry consolidation
if licenses are made transferable, despite windfall profits that could be made by
selling them. In spring 2012, a lifelong lobsterman with two decades of leadership
experience in the Maine Lobstermen’s Association estimated that 75% of license
holders oppose making licenses sellable. Similarly, a state legislator recalls
hearing from one zone representative, “If we ever get to a point where a kid
getting out of high school can’t get a license, we should all be taken out and shot.”
Further, one lobster zone still bucks the trend, with no entry limit as late as early
2012. In that highly fishery-dependent zone, debates continue over the relative
importance of employment options in isolated villages and islands, compared to
the higher future profits that might be made with entry limits. So while the state
lobster industry has not embraced privatization wholesale, it has substantially
reordered the balance between the priorities of individuals and collectivities.
Hoping to scale up the communitarian political subjectivities of the fishery,
co-management inadvertently scaled down the logic of capital accumulation
through state-sanctioned regulatory exclusion. Even as lobstering subjects have
succeeded in constraining the greediest among them, they consolidated fishery
control, partially sidelining other village interests. Witnessing an increasing
number of entry-related legislative proposals, and with public debate mounting,
the balance between individual profits and collective well-being will continue
to evolve, in rhetoric and policy. With it evolves a tension within fishing
subjectivities between dense local affinities that argue for broader distribution
of ecological goods and services, and instrumental motives more comfortably
supported at supra-local scales, which would concentrate resource profits in the
shorter and longer terms.

4. Toward plural commons
Limited to the particular instance of Maine lobster, these observations may seem
less than precipitous. The economic woes and deliberative claims of a few thousand
people living in a relatively developed and resource-rich locale are not the most
pressing of global policy concerns. Nor are these outcomes unduly surprising to
political ecologists. The case raises questions, however, about the trend toward
decentralized co-management in fisheries, forests, water, wildlife, and other
resources. Commons scholars have rightly won wide acclaim for distilling elegant
rules that enable successful resource conservation beyond government or markets.
Nonetheless, as Ostrom herself points out, most commons are nested in dense
institutional landscapes. The target resource and the target resource users are never
the only variables in play. Resource users and other community members have
interests, capabilities, and burdens that reach across scales of analysis. Further,
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the parameters and relative salience of those scales change over time. While we
might laud the interest of governments, non-governmental organizations, and
parastatal organizations in policy innovation to empower decision making at more
local scales, those interventions inevitably reconstitute any number of political
subjects, in ways that can trigger a perpetual cascade of changes throughout the
human-environment system.
Put in more practical terms, policies purporting to conserve resources can
alter resource access patterns in ways that are ultimately more or less desirable for
different segments of society. Not only do we each maintain multiple rationalities
simultaneously, but the predominance of one rationale over others depends partly
on which scalar frame of reference prevails at any given moment. Re-aligning
collective identities by bolstering them in one decision arena or another affects
not only how each person understands her social position, but how each perceives
capacities for collective action, and which inevitably divergent loyalties adhere. This
is as true of researchers and policymakers as it is of resource users. The scales we
choose in the course of inquiry, explanation, and decision making result in different
epistemologies, assessments, and policy outcomes. Governments, industry, NGOs,
and other groups are co-creating new management institutions in both more and less
developed contexts worldwide. If we fail to consider appropriate scales of analysis
and ensure opportunities for public deliberation prior to policy implementation, some
populations will bear socio-ecological costs without prior consent or knowledge.
Other papers in this journal have pointed to related concerns about
institutional complexity, and have offered plausible means by which to cope
(Berkes 2008; Cox 2011; Stern 2011). The present paper offers no systematic
solution, but presents one example of a well-documented commons that we
might assess differently by adopting more deeply theorized notions of political
scale and subjectivity. While scholars and decision makers are inevitably limited
in capabilities and resources, if we do not maintain broadly critical perspectives
on our own assumptions, if we do not allow analysis and deliberation to inform
one another before initiating social experiments, we run the risk of creating
new policy problems, even if we resolve existing ones. As demonstrated by
the interplay of theoretical frameworks to re-examine the lobster case, deep
empirical research and persistent interaction among epistemic communities in
scholarship and practice can help to identify and explore decision tradeoffs. Such
work is not always rewarded by academic audiences or in polarized decision
arenas, but it may produce knowledge and practice that better accommodate
socio-ecological pluralism.

Literature cited
Acheson, J. M. 1988. Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover, NH: New England
University Press.
Acheson, J. M. 1997. The Politics of Managing the Maine Lobster Industry: 1860
to the Present. Human Ecology 25(1):3–27.

338

Jennifer F. Brewer

Acheson, J. M. 1998. Lobster Trap Limits: A Solution to a Communal Action
Problem. Human Organization 57(1):43–52.
Acheson, J. M. 2003. Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage
the Maine Lobster Industry. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
Acheson, J. M. and J. F. Brewer. 2000. Changes in Territoriality in the Maine
Lobster Fishery. In The Commons in the New Millenium: Challenges and
Adaptation, eds. N. Dolsak and E. Ostrom. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Acheson, J. M. and R. Gardner. 2011. The Evolution of the Maine Lobster
V-Notch Practice: Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Ecology and
Society 16(1):41.
Acheson, J. M. and J. Knight. 2000. Distribution Fights, Coordination Games
and Lobster Management. Comparative Studies in Society and History 42(1):
209–238.
Acheson, J. M. and R. S. Steneck. 1997. Bust and then Boom in the Maine Lobster
Industry: Perspectives of Fisheries Managers and Biologists. North American
Journal of Fisheries Management 17(4):826–847.
Acheson, J. M. and L. Taylor. 2001. The Anatomy of the Maine Lobster
Comanagement Law. Society & Natural Resources 14:425–441.
Agrawal, A. 2002. Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability. In Drama
of the Commons, eds. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. Stern, S. Stonich, and
E. Weber. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Agrawal, A. and C. C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The
Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation. World Development
27(4):629–649.
Ames, E. P. 2004. The Stock Structure of Atlantic Cod in the Gulf of Maine.
Fisheries 29(1):10–28.
Armitage, D. R., R. Plummer, F. Berkes, R. I. Arthur, A. T. Charles, I. J.
Davidson-Hunt, A. P. Diduck, N. C. Doubleday, D. S. Johnson, M. Marschke,
P. McConney, E. W. Pinkerton, and E. K. Wollenberg. 2008. Adaptive Comanagement for Social-ecological Complexity. Frontiers in Ecology and the
Environment 7(2):95–102.
Baland, J. M. and J. P. Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources:
Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bebbington, A. and J. Carney. 1990. Geography in the International Agricultural
Research Centers: Theoretical and Practical Concerns. Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 80(1):34–48.
Berkes, F. 2008. Commons in a Multi-Level World. International Journal of the
Commons 2(1):1–6.
Berkes, F., D. Feeney, B. McCay, and J. Acheson. 1989. The Benefits of the
Commons. Nature 340:91–93.
Biersack, A. and J. B. Greenberg, eds. 2006. Reimagining Political Ecology.
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
Blaikie, P. and H. C. Brookfield. 1987. Land Degradation and Society. London:
Methuen.

Revisiting Maine’s lobster commons: rescaling political subjects

339

Brenner, N. 2001. The Limits to Scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar
Structuration. Progress in Human Geography 25(4):591–614.
Brewer, J. F. 2010. Polycentrism and Flux in Spatialized Management: Evidence
from Maine’s Lobster (Homarus americanus) Fishery. Bulletin of Marine
Science 86(2):287–302.
Brewer, J. F. 2011. Paper Fish and Policy Conflict: Catch Shares and EcosystemBased Management in Maine’s Groundfishery. Ecology and Society 16(1):15.
Brewer, J. F. 2012. Don’t Fence Me In: Boundaries, Policy, and Deliberation in
Maine’s Lobster Commons. Annals of the American Association of Geographers
102(2):383–402.
Brookfield, H. C. 1964. Questions on the Frontiers of Geography. Economic
Geography 40:283–303.
Butler, M. J., L. L. Steele, and R. A. Robertson. 2001. Adaptive Resource
Management in the New England Groundfish Fishery: Implications for Public
Participation and Impact Assessment. Society and Natural Resources 14:
791–801.
Carothers, C. 2011. Equity and Access to Fishing Rights: Exploring the
Community Quota Program in the Gulf of Alaska. Human Organization 70(3):
213–223.
Chang, J.-H., Y. Chen, D. Holland, and J. Grabowski. 2010. Estimating Spatial
Distribution of American Lobster Homarus Americanus Using Habitat Variables.
Marine Ecology Progress Series 420:145–156.
Cixous, H. and C. Clément. 1986 [1975]. The Newly Born Woman. Translated by
B. Wing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Copes, P. 1986. A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries
Management. Land Economics 62(3):278–291.
Cox, K. R. 2003. Political Geography and the Territorial. Political Geography
22:607–610.
Cox, M. 2011. Advancing the Diagnostic Analysis of Environmental Problems.
International Journal of the Commons 5(2):346–363.
Degnbol, P., H. Gislason, S. Hanna, S. Jentoft, J. R. Nielsen, S. Sverdrup-Jensen,
and D. C. Wilson. 2006. Painting the Floor with a Hammer: Technical Fixes in
Fisheries Management. Marine Policy 30(5):534–543.
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. C. Stern. 2003. The Struggle to Govern the Commons.
Science 302(5652):1907–1912.
Dongier, P., J. Van Domelen, E. Ostrom, A. Rizvi, W. Wakeman, A. Bebbington,
S. Alkire, T. Esmail, and M. Polski. 2002. Community Driven Development. In
A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies, ed. J. Klugman, Washington,
DC: The World Bank.
Ellen, R. 1988. Persistence and Change in the Relationship Between
Anthropology and Human Geography. Progress in Human Geography 12(2):
229–262.
Elmhirst, R. 2011. Introducing New Feminist Political Ecologies. Geoforum
42(2):129–132.

340

Jennifer F. Brewer

Enloe, C. 2000. The Surprised Feminist. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture &
Society 25(4):1023.
Escobar, A. 1996. Constructing Nature: Elements for a Poststructural Political
Ecology. In Liberation Ecologies, eds. R. Peet and M. Watts, New York:
Routledge.
Eythórsson, E. 2000. A Decade of ITQ-Management in Icelandic Fisheries:
Consolidation without Consensus. Marine Policy 24(6):483–492.
Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B. McCay, and J. Acheson. 1990. The Tragedy of the
Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later. Human Ecology 18(1):1–19.
Feit, H. A. and J. J. Spaeder. 2005. Co-management and Indigenous Communities:
Barriers and Bridges to Decentralized Resource Management – Introduction.
Anthropologica 47(2):147–154.
Finley, C. 2009. The Social Construction of Fishing, 1949. Ecology and Society
14(1):6.
Gal, S. 2002. A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction. Differences: A Journal
of Feminist Cultural Studies 13(1):77–95.
Gibbs, M. T. 2010. Why ITQs on Target Species are Inefficient at Achieving
Ecosystem based Fisheries Management Outcomes. Marine Policy 33(1):
83–89.
Gibson-Graham, J. K. 1995. Identity and Economic Plurality: Rethinking
Capitalism and ‘Capitalist Hegemony’. Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 13(3):275–282.
Harding, S. 2008. Sciences from Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and
Modernities. Durham: Duke University Press.
Jackson, J. B. C., M. X. Kirby, W. H. Berger, K. A. Bjorndal, L. W. Botsford,
B. J. Bourque, R. H. Bradbury, R. Cooke, J. Erlandson, J. A. Estes, T. P. Hughes,
S. Kidwell, C. B. Lange, H. S. Lenihan, J. M. Pandolfi, C. H. Peterson, R. S.
Steneck, M. J. Tegner, and R. R. Warner. 2001. Historical Overfishing and the
Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems. Science 293(5530):629.
Katz, C. 2001. On the Grounds of Globalization: A Topography for Feminist
Political Engagement. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society
26(4):1213.
Kristeva, J. 1986 [1973]. The System and the Speaking Subject. In The Kristeva
Reader, ed. T. Moi, Oxford: Blackwell.
Larkin, P. A. 1977. An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield.
Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 106(1):1–11.
Ludwig, D., R. Hilborn, and C. Walters. 1993. Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation,
and Conservation: Lessons from History. Science 260(5104):17–36.
Mansfield, B. 2004. Rules of Privatization: Contradictions in Neoliberal Regulation
of North Pacific Fisheries. Annals of the Association of American Geographers
94(3):565–584.
Mansuri, G. and V. Rao. 2004. Community-Based and -Driven Development: A
Critical Review. The World Bank Research Observer 19(1):1–39.

Revisiting Maine’s lobster commons: rescaling political subjects

341

Marston, S. A. 2000. The Social Construction of Scale. Progress in Human
Geography 24(2):219–242.
Massey, D. 1995. Thinking Radical Democracy Spatially. Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space 13(3):283–288.
McCay, B. J. and J. M. Acheson. 1987. The Question of the Commons: The
Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tuscon, AZ: University of
Arizona Press.
Moran, E. F. 1990. Ecosystem Ecology in Biology and Anthropology: A Critical
Assessment. In The Ecosystem Approach in Anthropology: From Concept to
Practice, ed. E. F. Moran, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Mosse, D. 2003. The Rule of Water. Statecraft, Ecology and Collective Action in
South India. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Munk-Madsen, E. 1998. The Norwegian Fishing Quota System: Another
Patriarchal Construction? Society and Natural Resources 11(3):229–240.
National Research Council. 1999. Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on
Individual Fishing Quotas. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
Nelson, F. and A. Agrawal. 2008. Patronage or Participation? Community-based
Natural Resource Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Development
and Change 39(4):557–585.
Netting, R. 1976. What Alpine Peasants have in Common: Observations on
Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village. Human Ecology 4(2):135–146.
Nightingale, A. J. 2011. Bounding Difference: Intersectionality and the Material
Production of Gender, Caste, Class and Environment in Nepal. Geoforum
42(2):153–162.
Orlove, B. S. 1980. Ecological Anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology
9:235–273.
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Ostrom, E. 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of SocialEcological Systems. Science 325:419–422.
Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardener. 1991. Rules, Games, and Common Pool
Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Pahl-Wostl, C. 1995. The Dynamic Nature of Ecosystems: Chaos and Order
Entwined. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Pinkerton, E. and D. N. Edwards. 2009. The Elephant in the Room: The Hidden
Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas. Marine Policy
33(4):707–713.
Popke, E. J. 2003. Managing Colonial Alterity: Narratives of Race, Space
and Labor in Durban, 1870–1920. Journal of Historical Geography 29(2):
248–267.
Rappaport, R. A. 1990. Ecosystems, Populations and People. In The Ecosystem
Approach in Anthropology: From Concept to Practice, ed. E. F. Moran, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

342

Jennifer F. Brewer

Rasul, G., G. B. Thapa, and M. B. Karki. 2011. Comparative Analysis of Evolution
of Participatory Forest Management Institutions in South Asia. Society &
Natural Resources 24(12):1322–1334.
Robbins, P. 2004. Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Critical Introductions
to Geography. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Rocheleau, D. and R. Roth. 2007. Rooted Networks, Relational Webs and Powers
of Connection: Rethinking Human and Political Ecologies. Geoforum 38:
433–437.
Rocheleau, D., B. Thomas-Slayter, and E. Wangari, eds. 1996. Feminist Political
Ecology: Global Issues and Local Experiences. New York: Routledge.
Saila, S. B., S. W. Nixon, and C. A. Oviatt. 2002. Does Lobster Trap Bait
Influence the Maine Inshore Trap Fishery? North American Journal of Fisheries
Management 22(2):602–605.
Sauer, C. O. 1941. Foreword to Historical Geography. Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 31:1–24.
Sayre, N. F. 2005. Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for
Integration. Progress in Human Geography 29(3):276–290.
St. Martin, K. 2001. Making Space for Community Resource Management in
Fisheries. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91(1):122–142.
Stallins, J. A. 2012. Scale, Causality, and the New Organism-Environment
Interaction. Geoforum 43(3):427–441.
Steneck, R. S. and C. J. Wilson. 2001. Large-Scale and Long-Term, Spatial and
Temporal Patterns in Demography and Landings of the American Lobster,
Homarus americanus, in Maine. Marine and Freshwater Research 52(8):
1303–1319.
Steneck, R. S. and J. A. Wilson. 2010. A Fisheries Play in an Ecosystem Theater:
Challenges of Managing Ecological and Social Drivers of Marine Fisheries at
Multiple Spatial Scales. Bulletin of Marine Science 86(2):387–411.
Stern, P. C. 2011. Design Principles for Global Commons: Natural Resources and
Emerging Technologies. International Journal of the Commons 5(2):213–232.
Steward, J. 1955. The Concept and Method of Cultural Ecology. In The Theory of
Cultural Change. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Turner, B. L., II. 1989. The Specialist-Synthesis Approach to the Revival of
Geography: The Case of Cultural Ecology. Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 79:88–100.
Turner, B. L., II. 2002. Contested Identities: Human-Environment Geography and
Disciplinary Implications in a Restructuring Academy. Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 92(1):52–74.
Wade, R. 1988. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in
South India. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
Walters, C. J., V. Christensen, S. J. Martell, and J. F. Kitchell. 2005. Possible
Ecosystem Impacts of Applying MSY Policies from Single-Species Assessment.
ICES Journal of Marine Science 62:558–568.

Revisiting Maine’s lobster commons: rescaling political subjects

343

Wilson, J. A. 1990. Fishing for Knowledge. Land Economics 66(1):12–29.
Wilson, J. 2007. Scale and Costs of Fishery Conservation. International Journal
of the Commons 1(1):29–41.
Wilson, J. A., J. French, P. Kleban, S. R. McKay, and R. Townsend. 1991. Chaotic
Dynamics in a Multiple Species Fishery: A Model of Community Predation.
Ecological Modelling 58(1–4):303–322.
Wilson, J. A., B. Low, R. Costanza, and E. Ostrom. 1999. Scale Misperceptions
and the Spatial Dynamics of a Social-Ecological System. Ecological Economics
31:243–257.
Wilson, D. C., J. R. Nielsen, and P. Degnbol, eds. 2003. The Fisheries Comanagement Experience: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Prospects.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Wilson, J., L. Yan, and C. Wilson. 2007. The Precursors of Governance in the
Maine Lobster Fishery. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
104(39):15212–15217.
Young, O. 2006. Vertical Interplay Among Scale-Dependent Environmental and
Resource Regimes. Ecology and Society 11(1):27.
Zimmerer, K. S. 1996. Ecology as Cornerstone and Chimera in Human Ecology.
In Concepts in Human Geography, eds. C. Earle, K. Mathewson, and M. S.
Kenzer, Latham: Rowan and Littlefield.

